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The Sex Discrimination Provisions Of
Title VII: A Maturing Controversy

JONATHAN J. WILCOX*

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in employment. But the Act contained
an exception clause, commonly known as the BFOQ, which allows
such discriminationwhen sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification." Recently courts have been faced with the problem of interpreting this exception clause and determining when sex is a
BFOQ. The courts have yet to offer a satisfactory standard for
applying the BFOQ exception to justify discrimination. The author
of this article, by a textual analysis of Title VII, suggests such a
standard.
Some of California's labor laws pertaining solely to female employees have been declared to be in conflict with Title VII under
a recent federal court of appeal decision. Thus, employers may
not be able to rely on state labor laws to justify sex discrimination. The California supreme court, however, has gone beyond the requirements of Title VII. The court recently held that
any legislationwhich classifies on the basis of sex is "inherently suspect" as a violation of the equal protection clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions. This article presents an overview of the
recent cases on sex discrimination and discusses problems which
will be created for employers and legislators when dealing with
female employees.
* BA., with honors, Rutgers University 1965; J.D. University of California,
Berkeley 1968. Member of the California Bar. Former Attorney, State Department
of Human Resources Development. Presently associated in the firm of Belli, Ashe,
Ellison, Choulos & Lieff. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance and contribution of David B. Johnson who did the analysis of the SaiI'er Inn case.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 3
The increasingly successful assertion of women's rights has presented new and sometimes enigmatic legal problems. One of these is
the obvious and litigated conflict between Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 and the numerous state labor laws that draw distinctions
according to sex. In California, for example, where several code sections and some constitutional provisions distinquished persons according to sex, 2 the Federal Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed a 1967 California district court decision that struck
down the state's maximum hours and maximum weights laws that affected women only.
The court decisions to date have not indicated which particular sex
distinctions, if any, remain valid. Unless labor legislation is soon
devised to affect the sexes equally or to adopt permissible distinctions,
many existing state labor laws will be superseded by Title VII pursuant to the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 4 It is the purpose
of this article to explore the nature of this conflict between federal
and state law and to determine which sex distinctions, if any, comport with the requirements of Title VII.
The matter has been no less puzzling to commentators than to the
courts. Widely differing interpretations of the prohibition against sex
discrimination in employment have been suggested.i Without attempting to dispose of the social arguments that have concerned many
of the writers, this article presents a purview of the legal principles
that would appear to apply should the courts re-examine the pertinent
fourteenth amendment equal protection precedents in light of a textual
analysis of Title VII. The goal here is to identify the breadth of the
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception clause of Title
VII as it applies to sex discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress almost inadvertently disturbed
of judicial thought regarding laws which
it added sex to the list of prohibited bases
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

the resolve and consistency
differentiated by sex when
for employment discriminaof 1964.8 The fateful word

1. 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1964).

2. See, for example, CAL. IAoR CODE §§1171, 1173, 1174, 1178, 1182, 1184-5,
1188, 1191-3, 1195.5, 1197.5, 1201, 1250-5, 1350-6, 1352.2, 2350, 3080.5; CAL. EDUC.
CODE §13456; CAL. HEALTH & SAxETY CODE §§33337, 33435-6, 35700, 35730 et seq.
CAL. CONST. art. XX, §17'A.
3. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
5. Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232, 249, 254 (1965); Oldham, Sex Discrimination

and State Protective Laws, 44 DEN. L. REv. 344, 370 (1967).
6. Oldham, Sex Discriminationand State Protective Laws, 44 DEN. L. REV. 344,

347 (1967); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1964).
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was added in a last-minute floor amendment, and the sketchy legislative history is of little assistance in determining the intent of Congress.7
The Act prohibits inter alia discrimination on the basis of sex in
employment opportunities, and it applies to employers, unions, and
employment agencies. 8 Because the Act prohibits such discrimination, there is a possible conflict between Title VII and state laws whose
original intent was to protect the female worker. For example, California employers are prohibited from requiring or permitting females to
work in excess of eight hours per day, to lift weights in excess of
fifty pounds, or to use stairways in certain circumstances.9 An
employer whose method of operation requires employees to work in excess of these limitations cannot avoid being impaled on one or the
other horn of this legal dilemma. Compliance with the state regulation
may cause the employer to violate Title VII, while compliance with Title VII may necessitate an illegal practice under state law. The employer may be subject to legal sanctions regardless of which alternative
he selects.
But there is another dimension to the problem, for Congress included
in Title VII an exception clause, commonly known as the BFOQ,
which permits sex discrimination in employment where sex is a
"bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 10 This exception
clause, on its face, could arguably accommodate reasonable employer
practices and all requirements of state protective laws for women.
Indeed, some district court decisions, subsequently overruled, so held.11
The BFOQ clause adds to the problem of interpretation, however, for
the exception itself is of undefined scope. The phrase "bona fide occupational qualification" is not defined in the Act, nor is it a term of
statutory usage to which ejusdem generis might apply."2 Any definition that is developed for the BFOQ must also take into account the
two "savings" clauses in the Act that preserve "non-conflicting" state
laws. Since the "savings" clauses do not identify such state lawsother than as those laws operating in the field in which the Act operates and which are not in conflict with the Act-the focus of interpretation remains on the anti-discrimination clause and its BFOQ
exception.
IOWA

7. Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50
L. REV. 778, 791-2 (1964-5).

8. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1964).
9. CAL. LABOR CODE §1251, 1252, 1350.

10. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e) (1964).
11. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967); Weeks
v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967)."
12. 45 Cal. Jur. 2d Statutes §145 (1958).
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The prohibition against sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 reads as follows (provisions specifically applicable
to employment agencies and unions are left out for simplicity)
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 13
The pertinent clause of Title VII setting forth the BFOQ exception appears in another subdivision of the same section
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees. . . on the basis of
. . . religion, sex, or national origin. . . where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. .. 4 (emphasis added).
Where possible conflict between Title VII and state protective labor laws
for women is concerned, the federal statutory picture is not complete
without the two "savings" clauses in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
One of the provisions applies specifically to Title VII of the Act
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve
any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter. 15
The other provision applies generally to the entire Civil Rights Act of
1964
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on
the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
13. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1964).

14. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e) (1964).
15. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-7 (1964).
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provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act,
or any provisions thereof. 16
The phrase "any purposes of this Act" is the one textual reference
to an external standard that tends to break the circular interpretive
reasoning that Title VII encourages. For example, even if one had a
definition for "bona fide occupational qualification," the text of Title VII
indicates no resolution to the problem that arises where an employer's "normal operation" is compelled by the provisions of state law to
include employment restrictions against women. One could conclude
that sex as a BFOQ is "reasonably necessary" if such qualification is mandated by state law. But this rationale has not been accepted by the
courts.

17

The crux of the problem lies in the undefined phrase, "bona fide occupational qualification." For instance, if the BFOQ is defined in the
broadest sense, it will include all state laws that bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate ends sought to be achieved. (See discussion of Muller v. Oregon., infra). Conversely, if the BFOQ is narrowly defined to include only those state laws which draw distinctions
only upon innate sexual differences, the employer will be in the unenviable position of having to "second-guess" the courts as to whether a
given state law fits the narrow definition and thereby justifies his discrimination. In many cases there would only be a choice of violating
federal or state law. Until a satisfactory interpretation is made and accepted, the employer will always be faced with this problem.
The following textual analysis of Title VII represents an interpretation
of the BFOQ clause which will, hopefully, be of some predictive value
when applying present decisions under Title VII to future cases.
The "savings" clauses affecting Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as a whole, provide that certain state laws shall not be preserved:
[Persons are not exempted or relieved from obligations imposed by
state law] . . . other than any such law which purports to require
or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.1 8
. . . Nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent
with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provisions thereof.' 9
(Emphasis added).
16. 42 U.S.C. §2000h-4 (1964).

17. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
18. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-7 (1964).
19. 42 U.S.C. §2000h-4 (1964).
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The two words italicized above indicate, respectively, that state laws
possess no special sanctity in comparison with employer or union
practices, and that the courts are invited to give effect to the overall
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in determining whether a
state law is in conflict. No difficulty arises in sustaining a state fair
employment practices law-indeed, Title VII specifically provides that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may agree with a state
fair employment practices agency that the Commission will refrain
from processing charges of violations. 20 The problems all arise around
state laws that restrict employment opportunities for one sex (almost universally women). In order to give effect to the first of these two
"savings" clauses, it is necessary to devise a standard that will invalidate
a certain class of otherwise consitutionally sound state laws. One
may reasonably look to the "purposes" of the Act (as suggested by the
second, general "savings" clause) to discover which class of state laws
offend the prohibition against sex discrimination.
The barren legislative history relating to the last-minute addition of
the word "sex" to Title VII may, in a roundabout way, actually assist
textual analysis. This writer proposes that "sex" took on the "social"
discriminatory character of its neighbors of the Act,-race, color, religion and national origin,-by its inclusion without explanations or
special provisions that would seem to be necessary if the full biological
implications of the word were intended. If the biological aspects of sex
are excluded from Title VII, interpretation becomes somewhat easier.
There is another aspect to the investigation of the company "sex!'
keeps. It was contended in an Iowa Law Review Note relied on
by the district court in one of the leading cases, Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,21 that the association of "sex" with "religion" and
"national origin" in the BFOQ exception clause indicated that the word
was "treated [by Congress] entirely separately from color and in generic terms, not individual terms. 22 The observation is persuasive
in light of the intense association of race and color with the protection
of individuals from discrimination, but it is misapplied to the entirety of
Title VII. Outside of the BFOQ clause, "sex", along with "religion"
and "national origin", keeps the company of "race" and "color", which,
according to the reasoning of the Iowa Law Review Note, are individual
attributes. How could it be that "sex" is an individual attribute in the
prohibitory clause and a generic attribute in the exception clause of
20. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4(f) (4) (1964).

21. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
22. Id. at 364.
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Title VII? Alternatively, how could "sex" be a generic term throughout Title VII without requiring application of the fourteenth amendment
equal protection standard to screen conflicting state laws? In such
case no otherwise valid state law would be invalidated by Title VII
(a result contrary to the "savings" clauses). Yet there are reasons to
believe that the search for a generic standard for the BFOQ was close
to the mark.
The text of the bona fide occupational qualification exception clause
contains a subtle distinction between two types of discriminatory treatment in employment opportunities-the distinction is based on employment activities rather than personal attributes
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment
agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual,
for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such
program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or

enterprise. ..

23

(emphasis added).

Without reference to other provisions of Title VII, it is clear that this
clause (the BFOQ) permits employers to "hire and employ" "employees"
(a generic term), and permits unions to "classify" "membership" (a generic term) on a qualified discriminatory basis. In contrast, all other
employment activities mentioned in the clause relate to the treatment
received by "individuals." Thus it would appear that for certain employment activities qualified discrimination on a generic basis is permitted, and for other employment activities qualified discrimination on
an individual basis is permitted. One may observe at this point that
unions and employment agencies typically supply individuals to fill
positions for certain types of workers (a generic classification). It
remains to reconcile these provisions with the general provision in
Title VII that prohibits discrimination against any individual
(a) It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
23. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e) (1964).
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to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.24 (Emphasis added).
When the prohibition and exception clauses are read together a certain
logic may be deduced from the pattern of generic and individual categories of discrimination: generalized treatment of workers for administrative ease, but protection of their individual right to be free of
prohibited discrimination. The paramount requirement of Title VII is
that no individual shall be subjected to prohibited discrimination. Obviously there must exist exceptions, for Congress presumably created
the BFOQ for a reason. The textual analysis developed here leads one
to conclude that the function of the BFOQ is to authorize generic discrimination in employment practices (which are the focus of the BFOQ
clause) subject to the proscription that no individual shall suffer
as a result of such generic discrimination.
This would appear to be nonsense except for the fact that there is
an easily imagined purpose to this scheme of generic and individual
discrimination. Although Title VII lacks a relevant statement of purpose for the BFOQ, the purpose for such an exception clause seems
evident. Large scale employers face a peculiar administrative burden relative to sex distinctions. For example, it is clearly easier and
more efficient to assign men to strenuous physical activities than to
test all employees for strength-sex is a convenient, though imprecise,
classification of physical strength.
In any case of generic discrimination the burden of proving a justifiable classification on the basis of sex would be upon the employer.
He should be able to rely on any reported decisions of the courts or the
E.E.O.C. to justify such classification. However, any individual must
have the opportunity to show he or she can be excepted from the classification. That is, a female will have the burden of proving she has
the requisite physical strength if the basis of the "sexual" classification
is physical strength.
This interpretation of Title VII finds support in two provisions of Title VII that otherwise seem to undercut the objectives of the statute
by leaving room for abuse. There is a provision that a notice of advertisement relating to employment
24. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1964).
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may indicate a preference, limitation, specification or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification for em24
ployment. a
This statement of permission is readily -understood if its specific objective is the implementation of a generic standard established by an
employer or union where the standard may be challenged by any individual or by the class of persons meant to be affected. The other provision
of Title VII that is difficult to comprehend as anything but an escape
clause without this purpose in mind is the provision that permits differential treatment of employees on several grounds that might be
used to mask the effects of prohibited discrimination
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to give and act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.24b
This provision is also understandable as a means of vesting in employers
the discretion to administer their businesses as they see fit, without
excessive burdens placed on their treatment of employees as a class,
so long as the intention and effect are not to discriminate in a prohibited
manner. Again, it is the right of the affected individual to challenge the
employer's determination that prevents the statutory design from
carrying the seeds of its own destruction.
Before discussing the equal protection decisions and the cases arising
under Title VII, the E.E.O.C. interpretations should be considered.
E.E.O.C. Interpretations
The interpretive efforts of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) are instructive of the nature and complexity of
the conflicts that may exist between Title VII and state protective laws.25
24a. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(b) (1964).
24b. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h) (1964).
25. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4 (1964). This section created the E.E.O.C. and provided
for the powers of the Commission.
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As originally promulgated in 1965, the E.E.O.C. regulations expressed
the Commission's belief that Congress intended Title VII to supersede

women's protective labor laws that had the effect of limiting employment opportunities. To this end the Commission suggested that laws
providing benefits to women should be upheld, and that laws prohibiting or restricting employment of women in hazardous situations
should be upheld only if technologically relevant.26

The Commission's position had two salient characteristics: (1) it assumed that employment restrictions based on sex should be treated
generically, for only on that basis could a reasonable weight limitation
be recognized
be raised as a
(2) it reserved
determination

as a bona fide occupational qualification which could
defense to a Title VII suit brought by an individual; and
to the E.E.O.C. as conciliator and to the courts the final
whether a particular women's protective labor law was

"reasonable", and that in turn implied a case-by-case determination
whether a state law that was presumably valid under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment would be superseded by
Title VII under the supremacy clause.
The first major decision handed down by a federal court, Bowe v.
26. 30 Fed. Reg. 14927 (1965).
1604.1 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
as to sex should be interpreted narrowly...
(3) Most States have enacted laws or administrative regulations with respect
to the employment of women. These laws fall into two general categories:
(i) laws that require certain benefits be provided for female employees,
such as minimum wages, premium pay for overtime, rest periods or physical
facilities;
(ii) laws that prohibit the employment of women in certain hazardous occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting of heavy weights, during certain hours of
the night, or for more than a specified number of hours per day or per week.
(b) The Commission believes that some state laws and regulations with respect to the employment of women, though originally promulgated for valid
protective reasons, have ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the woman worker in our economy. We shall continue to
study the problems...
(c) The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to disturb
such laws and regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women against exploitation and hazard. Accordingly, the Commission
will consider limitations or prohibitations imposed by such state laws or regulations as a basis for application of the bona fide occupational qualifications
exception. However, in cases where the clear effect of a law in current circumstances is not to protect women but to subject them to discrimination, the
law will not be considered a justification for discrimination. So, for example,
restrictions on lifting weights will not be deemed in conflict with Title VII
except where the limit is set at an unreasonably low level which could not
endanger women.
(1) An employer, accordingly, will not be considered to be engaged in an
unlawful employment practice when he refuses to employ a woman in a job in
which women are legally prohibited from being employed or which involve
duties which women may not legally be permitted to perform because of
hazards reasonably to be apprehended from such employment.
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Colgate-Palmolive Company27 followed what the court understood the
E.E.O.C. regulation to mean; it made an exhaustive examination of the
reasonableness of an employer imposed weight lifting limitation, and
-having found the limitation reasonable--excluded all women from

jobs at Colgate-Palmolive which required lifting of heavier weights for
normal operation of the plant. An identical result was reached by a
Georgia federal district court dealing with women's weight-lifting restrictions imposed by state regulation in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company.28 Completely to the contrary was the
decision the following year by a California federal district court in
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company29 where the court issued a
declaratory summary judgment that California's weights and hours laws
for women were superseded by Title VII, and that the E.E.O.C. regulations were void to the extent they provided otherwise. All three
of these cases have grown in significance, for Bowe ° and Weeks"1
were reversed and Rosenfeld12 was affirmed in their respective circuits (7th, 5th and 9th). The E.E.O.C. itself was having second

thoughts about the kinds of protective labor legislation it was willing to see protected by the BFOQ exception, and in August 1969between the Bowe and Weeks circuit court decisions-the Commis-

sion promulgated amendments to the regulations. 3

Basically, the

27. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
28. 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967).
29. 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
30. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
31. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
32. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. 29 C.F.R. §1604.1 (1969).
1604.1 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.
(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly...
[subdivision (a) (3) has been deleted]
(b) (1) Many States have enacted laws to promulgated administrative regulations with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws are
those which prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employment of females in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying
of weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours of the
night, or for more than a specified number of hours per day or per week.
(2) The Commission believes that such State laws and regulations, although originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have
ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the female
worker in our economy. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of
individual females and tend to discriminate rather than protect. Accordingly,
the Commission has concluded that such laws and regulations conflict with
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis
for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
(Emphasis added).
The Commission announced new regulations pertaining to sex discrimination on January
1, 1971.
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amendments stated that the Commission found state laws that confer a
benefit as well as laws that restrict employment "tend to discriminate
rather than protect."34
JudicialApproach to Title VII
The circuit court decisions in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company35 and Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company"
reached the same conclusions the E.E.O.C. expressed in their amended
regulations-that laws prohibiting the employment of females in order to protect them from hazards "tend to discriminate rather than
protect," and that employment restrictions based on sex should be
treated on an individual rather than a generic basis. Thus, the reasonableness of a restriction could not justify discrimination against
an individual female who was in no need of the supposed protection.
The Rosenfeld case reflected this position in the district court decision,
recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal for the Ninth
and it was
Circuit. 37
This position probably serves better the purpose of ending sex discrimination in employment, but it creates some problems in the interpretation of Title VII. This difficulty is nowhere better exposed than in
the comparison between the circuit court and the district court opinions in Bowe, for both opinions are extensive and the principles apply
equally to employer practices and state protective laws (both of which
must qualify for the BFOQ exception).
The factual background in Bowe is enormously complicated, and no
attempt will be made to set it forth here. It suffices to say that
shortly after Title VII became effective a number of women employees were laid off for lack of work at a time when men, with
lesser seniority, were retained and even recalled due to the operation
of a seniority system that reserved a class of "Finishing Labor" jobs
(non-strenuous assembly-line work related to packaging and shipping
of toilet articles) for women only and reserved all other labor jobs,
with minor exceptions, to men. Shortly thereafter the collective bargaining agreement was "de-sexed" to the extent that jobs in "Finishing Labor" were no longer restricted to women, nor were there express
sex restrictions on any other jobs. But there continued under the new
contract an employer imposed thirty-five pound weight limit for
women that closed for women most "General Labor" jobs on the ba34.
35.
36.
37.

29 C.F.R.
416 F.2d
408 F.2d
444 F.2d

§1604.1(b)(2) (1969).
711 (7th Cir. 1969).
228 (5th Cir. 1969).
1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
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sis of the type of work to be performed. Colgate did not permit individual women to demonstrate that they could safely lift heavier
weights. In recounting this situation at great length, the district court
found ample evidence that both Colgate and the union had negotiated
the new contract and implemented 8 the weight restriction in a goodfaith effort to comply with Title VII.
At the time of the district court's decision in Bowe, it was virtually
a case of first impression. The court relied on its reading of the origi-'
nal version of the E.E.O.C. regulation and a well-researched law review
note39 to reach its interpretation of Title VII and the BFOQ exception.
In summary, the court found that Congress did not intend to strike
down state protective labor laws for women per se,40 and that there
was left, between the prohibition against sex discrimination and the
BFOQ exception, "an area in which the employer has discretionary
prerogatives" to determine the existence of a BFOQ exception.4 1
Since the weight limit was reasonable, it created a BFOQ exception.4 2 The court also found that the standard for defining the scope
of the BFOQ exception (and consequently the meaning of Title VH
as regards sex) should be analogous to the fourteenth amendment equal
protection standard. 43 Of these findings, the last is the critical one,
for it constitutes a judicial gloss upon the statute, as the court readily
admitted. 44 The law review note which the court heavily relied on in
its decision expressed the equal protection standard in a footnote
The test for equal protection is generally stated as follows: Is
the classification contained in the statute arbitrary . . . or is it
based upon a reasonable distinction having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation . . . ? (Citation omit45
ted).
The note also provided examples of the emloyer practices which
might fit the BFOQ exception were this standard to be applied by
analogy. 40 Taking into consideration the more restrictive position of
the E.E.O.C. regulations, 47 the court declined to accept the full implications of the proposed standard
In short, and perhaps in oversimplification, traditional roles and
stereotyped characteristics of taste or talent or emotions or tac38. 272 F. Supp. 332, 355-6 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
39. See note 7 supra.
40. 272 F. Supp. 332, 364 (S.D. Ind. 1967).

41. Id.
42. Id. at 365.
43. Id. at 362.

44. Id. at 363.

45. See note 7 supra, at 794.
46. Id. at 796.
47. 272 F. Supp. 332, 363 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
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tile facility and the like cannot be made the basis for generic
classification but generally recognized physical capabilities and physical limitations of the sexes may be made the basis for occupa48
tional qualification in generic terms.
The implications of the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard are broader than the district court in Bowe would admit. In the
landmark case Muller v. Oregon,49 the Court found more than strictly
biological distinctions between the sexes which served to justify class
legislation
• . .[H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. . . . Though limitations upon personal and
contractual rights may be removed by legislation, there is that in
her disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full
assertion of those rights. . . . Doubtless there are individual exceptions . . .but looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to
maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality . . . . This difference justifies a difference in legislation.
50

The application of the Muller equal protection standard suggests that
all women's protective labor laws, which are not invalid under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, should be recognized as creating BFOQ's based on sex. The implications are obvious; the standard
might tend to defeat some employer sex discrimination practices, but
it would almost always lend BFOQ sanction to state laws. At the
very least, maximum hours (Muller v. Oregon),5 ' night work prohibitions (Radice v. New York) ,52 premium overtime (Bunting v. Ore5 4 would
gon)53 and minimum wage (West Coast Hotel v. Parrish)
seemingly fit the BFOQ exception, unless the laws were so unreasonable that they violate the fourteenth amendment.
In Bowe, the court of appeal disagreed with the district court's
contention that the Title VII "savings" clause preserved all state protective labor laws for women. The appellate court cited recent conciliation cases in which the E.E.O.C. indicated that its regulations were
"not to be read as an approval of general weight limits by sex in any
state or even in a particular industry." 55 The circuit court did not
indicate what standard should be used to determine whether Title
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 365.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Id. at 421-422.
208 U.S. 412, 416 (1908).
264 U.S. 292 (1924).
243 U.S. 426 (1917).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
416 F.2d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 1969).
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VII supersedes a state law or an employer practice; it even impliedly
removed the standard of "reasonableness" by holding that no particular weight limit for female employees would fit the BFOQ exception.5 This last position was essential, for it resulted from the circuit court's adoption of the position taken by the E.E.O.C. in its conciliation cases that
individuals must be considered on the basis of individual capacities
and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to
the group. 57
The basic theoretical problem in dealing with Title VII sex discrimination cases is thus exemplified in the disagreement between the district and circuit courts in Bowe over the question whether the BFOQ
exception should be justified (by the employer) on a generic or individual basis of sex discrimination.
The same issues and virtually the same outcomes prevailed in
the district and circuit court decisions in Weeks.5 8 The facts were
simple; the defendant awarded a "switchman" position to a man who
had lesser seniority than Mrs. Weeks on the ground that the job
required regular lifting of weights in excess of the thirty-pound limit for
women set by the Georgia Commissioner of Labor. With only a brief
mention of the E.E.O.C. regulations to support the position that
Congress did not intend to nullify state protective laws, the district court
held that Georgia's administrative regulation established a BFOQ
based on sex.5 9 The circuit court reversed, holding that the defendant
had failed to satisfy "it's burden of proving that the particular requirements of the job of switchman justify excluding women from consideration."6 0 A large part of Southern Bell's case had disappeared in
the interim between the two courts because the Georgia Commissioner
of Labor had repealed the thirty-pound flat limitation and replaced it
with a rule that weights should be limited "so as to avoid strains or
undue fatigue." 61 Nonetheless the circuit court reviewed the available
evidence in the record which might justify the employment restriction as a reasonable employer practice, and it found no such justification aside from "stereotypes" of the general capacities of women. Perhaps because it found no evidence approaching justification for the
BFOQ exception, the circuit court did not elaborate its standard, aside
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967); 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
277 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D. Ga. 1967).
408 F.2d 228, 244 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id.
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from indicating its preference for an individual, rather than a generic,
justification of sex discrimination
. . .The broad construction of the bona fide occupational qualification in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra [district court

decision] is inconsistent with the purpose of the Act-providing a
foundation in law for the principle of nondiscrimination [footnote
omitted]. Construed that broadly, the exception will swallow the
rule. We conclude that the principle of nondiscrimination requires that we hold that in order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual
basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job in-

volved. 62 (Emphasis added.)
In the footnote omitted above the court commented that it disagreed
with the theory of the Bowe district court decision more than with its
outcome. Without making a specific ruling on the following, the
court continued,
It may be that where an employer sustains its burden in demonstrating that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with
women on an individualized basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule. No such showing was made here ....11
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. is in many ways similar to the cir-

cuit court decision in Weeks; both decisions dealt with a direct conflict between state labor laws and Title VII, and both decisions invalidated the state laws. Mrs. Rosenfeld was passed over in her bid for
an agent-telegrapher's position at a remote Southern Pacific railway depot, and a man with lesser seniority was given the job. In defending
its action, Southern Pacific Company relied on California Labor Code
Sections 1350 (restricting the number of hours per day and per week
for female employers) and 1251 (restricting the weights that a female
employee may be required or permitted to lift), and the implementing
administrative regulations. Ruling more broadly than the case required, the district court held that all California weights and hours restrictions violated Title VII, and that none of those laws constituted a
BFOQ. 14 The opinion, though long, is extremely repetitive, and it
fails to specify the ratio decidendi. The district court did take special
notice, however, of Southern Pacific Company's failure to test or
evaluate Mrs. Rosenfeld's ability to perform the work involved, and it
did record its finding that the California legislation established "stand62. Id. at 235.
63. Id. at 235, note 5.
64. 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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ards which are 'unreasonably low' within the meaning of the EEOC
'[guidelines . . "65
The district court also found that neither
66
the laws nor the duties required 67 established a BFOQ. But the decision implied that both laws and job duties are potential bases for the
BFOQ exception.
The recent circuit court decision in Rosenfeld, affirming the district court decision, is much more informative. The court there specified that job duties could be considered as a basis for the BFOQ exception only if the employers tested the employee's individual abilities
and found them lacking,6 8 and that rules or laws expressing "characterizations of the physical capabilities and endurance of women" are
per se too broad to fit the requirements for the BFOQ exception.6 9 The
court dealt gingerly with the problem of job assignments in a complex industrial situation. It noted that the circuit court in Weeks was
relieved of deciding whether it was at all possible for job duties, defined by company policy or state law, to establish a BFOQ by the trial
court's finding that Southern Bell Telephone Company had not met its
burden of proof to justify a sex-based distinction.70 In Rosenfeld the
circuit court was faced squarely with the problem because the appeal
followed summary judgment. The court resolved the problem by
limiting its ruling against Southern Pacific Company to the facts of the
case as presented on the appeal
.. . We conclude that Southern Pacific's employment policy is not
excusable under the BFOQ concept or the state statutes. We leave
undecided the questions of this kind which may arise concerning the

varying employment policies of other employers under circumstances unlike those of the present case.71

Thus the highest court which has to date directly considered the
problem of a conflict between state laws and Title VII respecting sex
discrimination has avoided establishing an interpretive standard. There
is clearly a trend, however, toward protection of individuals notwithstandingthe existence of a BFOQ.
By failing to establish a definition of BFOQ, the courts have failed
to provide employers with any standard as to the validity of their
employment practices. As the definition is in limbo, the problem arises
as to whether an employer, trying to satisfy economic practicalities
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1223.
444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1227.
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in the hiring process, may adopt a regulation that purports to be protective of women. The Supreme Court in a recent Title VII case that
was remanded for fuller development of the facts suggested such a re73
sult."2 Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corporation
dealt with restrictions on the employment of women with pre-schoolage children; presumably the employer sought to avoid the problems related to untimely demands made by children on their mothers, such as illness,
or perhaps it sought to avoid demands for expensive child day care facilities. Whatever the reason for the employment restrictions, the Court
commented, over Justice Marshall's dissent, that
The existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a
man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under Section 703
(e) [BFOQ] of the Act.7 4
Perhaps the Phillips case was too tangential to deserve the full attention of the court; in any event, "arguably" it is not a commitment of
opinion upon which to base future decisions. Essential to those future decisions will be an understanding of the effect of Title VII upon
those fourteenth amendment precedents whose entire substance rests
upon judicial opinion upholding the validity, against due process
and equal protection attacks, of state labor laws that distinguish the
sexes.
The Fourtheenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause: Precedents Involving Discriminationon the Basis of Sex
Muller v. Oregon" was the first case to reach the United States Supreme Court on the issue of sex as a basis for legislative classification in
state labor laws and it established the precedent for the legitimacy of
sex as a basis for such classification. Muller upheld the Oregon law
which provided for a limitation on working hours, for women only, in
"any mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry. '7 6 In Bunting
v.
Oregon7 the Court upheld an overtime pay provision by a five to three
decision only after reargument.7 8
In 1923, the Court nearly overruled Muller in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital7 9 where the majority struck down the District of Columbia
72. Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 39 U.S.L.W. 4160 (1971).
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
76. Id. at 416.

77. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).

78. Id.
79. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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minimum wage law for women.8 0 However, the Court distinguished
Muller on the ground that it represented legislation that was reasonably related to health and safety, compared with the minimum wage law
which the Court characterized as an attempt to legislate morals. 8 '
8"
In 1937 the Supreme Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
overruled Adkins and reaffirmed Muller. The constitutional provision
involved in West Coast Hotel was the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The statute in question established minimum
wages for women. The Court was concerned with upholding broad economic regulation and based its decision upon the general proposition
that the liberty of individuals to contract could be limited, consistent
with due process, in the interests of the community.8" The majority
eliminated any possible distinction between minimum wages and other
labor regulations such as maximum hours.8 4 Although the challenge
to Washington's minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel was based on
the due process clause, the Court cited Muller and Holden v. Hardys 5both decided on equal protection grounds-as authority for the proposition that the physical and social disabilities of women justified their
treatment as a class, "even when like legislation is not necessary for
men and could not be sustained."8' 6
The Court buttressed this conclusion with precedents establishing that
"legislative authority, acting within its proper field is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. ' 'st The
decision thus created a precedent justifying sex discrimination in state
laws on two separate grounds-(1) inherent differences between the
sexes and (2) legislation restricted to specific evils.
After 1941, when the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 which affected male and female employees, 8 it was clear that
extensive regulation of the employment relationship would be found
constitutional and differentiation by sex would likewise be constitus
tional. There the matter rested until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1a
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
86. 300 U.S. 379, 395 (1937).
87. Id. at 400.
88. 29 U.S.C.A. §201 et seq.
88a. As this article went to press, the United States Supreme Court held, in
Reed v. Reed, 40 U.S.L.W. 4013, that classification on the basis of sex is a violation of
the equal protection clause when such classification is unreasonable, arbitrary and does
not rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to
the object of the legislation. In Reed petitioner was challenging a Idaho statute
which gave a preference to males in appointments as administrators of estates. The
Court did not discuss the Muller, Adkins, or West Coast Hotel cases. The Court
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The Burden of Proof: A JudicialGloss
The interpretational problems of Title VII have been mentioned earlier: no statement of purpose, no significant legislative history, and a
lack of critical definitions, especially "bona fide occupational qualification." Yet, despite these problems the courts of appeal reached very
similar results in the Bowe, Weeks, and Rosenfeld cases in that the
state laws or regulations, and the employment practices involved, were
all invalidated solely on the basis of Title VII, with no mention made
as to the applicability of the fourteenth amendment. Had the courts felt
that the BFOQ was to be applied in a manner consistent with the provisions of equal protection and due process, they (the courts) certainly
had the opportunity to review the tenor of cases such as Muller, Bunting and West Coast Hotel, applied the standards of those cases, and
upheld the above laws and practices.
Analysis of Bowes, Weeks, and Rosenfeld thus leads to the inescapable conclusion that the absence of an express statement of purpose
in Title VII, the absence of significant legislative history, and the absence of a definitive standard for the BFOQ have not hampered the
courts in extending Title VII beyond the minimum constitutionally
established standards. The courts of appeal in handling these cases
did not take the opportunity to lay the foundation of an adequate
definition for the BFOQ exception in subsequent cases.
Certain specific conclusions did, however, emerge from these cases.
Weeks held that the burden of proof is on the employer to establish
the BFOQ for his employment practice because the court felt the
BFOQ was to be narrowly interpreted.89
In Bowe the court determined that there was no certainty as to
what would be a maximum weight-lifting limitation in employment.90
However, wherever a limitation is imposed, the employer must present each individual with the opportunity to demonstrate his or her
ability to perform the strenuous task. 1 It was further indicated that any
weight lifting limitation must be applied to both sexes. 2
The Rosenfeld appellate court noted that if the employer (citing
phrased the issue very narrowly in Reed and it is unlikely that Reed can be said to
have overruled Muller and West Coast Hotel. It seems clear that Reed can only be
cited for the proposition that state law which classifies according to sex is a violation of
equal protection if unreasonable or arbitrary. What is "unreasonable" may change as
society changes but the Court has not yet held that the equal protection clause requires
equal treatment of men and women in all cases. However, it is possible that the
Constitution will be amended in the future to guarantee equal treatment of men and
women under all state statutes.
89. 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
90. 416 F.2d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 1969).
91. id. at 718.
92. Id.
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Weeks) could prove it "had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and effectively the duties of the job involved"
it (the employer) could properly rely on the BFOQ exception as a legal basis for excluding women.9 3 The court went on to indicate
that for the employer to show such belief, the basis of the belief
must be that sexual characteristics "are crucial to the successful performance of the job, as they would be for the position of wet-nurse.
., Another finding was that the premise of Title VII "is that
women are now to be on equal footing with men."9 5 Such footing
cannot be equal unless all persons are given the opportunity to show
individual capacity for the position sought. 96
The Rosenfeld case seems to impose upon the state the burden of
showing that a state law is entitled to the BFOQ exception just as the
burden is upon the employer in defending his practices. The court
viewed the savings clauses as invalidating any state law inconsistent
with the provisions of Title VII,17 saying that the savings clauses
were added to save only those "state laws aimed at preventing or punishing discrimination. . . not to save inconsistent laws."981
From this discussion of Title VII and the cases decided subsequent
to its enactment, the following propositions appear valid:
1) By virtue of the savings clauses, existing employer practices and
state laws are not invalid unless they are inconsistent with Title VII.
2) Whether an employment practice or law is inconsistent with
Title VII depends upon the definition of "bona fide occupational qualification," that is, a broad or narrow application of the term.
3) The BFOQ has been narrowly interpreted to date, not in terms of
the fourteenth amendment standards, but rather in terms of stricter,
court imposed standards.
4) The burden of showing that a BFOQ is reasonably necessary is
upon the employer defending his practice, and upon the state defending
its law.
5) The burden of proving that a BFOQ is reasonably necessary
must go to a basic difference between the sexes, not merely a longstanding general notion that women are the weaker sex, or any other
scientifically unproven factor,9 9 and,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1226.
Local 246, Utility Workers Union v. Southern California Edison Co., 320 F.
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6) As the standards for a BFOQ, vague as they may be, go beyond
the fourteenth amendment standards, they apply to the states through
the operation of the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Sail'erInn v. Kirby
The problem of discrimination on the basis of sex, at least in California, may have taken on a new dimension by the recent decision of
Sail'er Inn v. Kirby where the California supreme court held that a
classification based upon sex falls into the domain of "suspect classifications." 100
California law in Section 25656 of the Business and Professions Code
prohibited women from tending bar except when they were the licensees, wives of licensees or were singly or with their husbands the
sole shareholders of a corporation holding the license.' 01 This was a
classic example of an instance where state law created a discriminatory classification that appeared to be in conflict with Title VII. The
employers were subject to legal action under Title VII if they failed
to hire women and they were subject to an action under the state law
if they hired women. Petitioners sought a writ of mandate to compel the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to cease license revocation proceedings based upon the state statute.
In granting mandamus, the California supreme court analyzed the
law from three directions:
1) Section 18 of Article XX of the State Constitution which pro02
hibits sex discrimination in employment;
2) Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and
3) The equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the
California Constitution.' 3
The court easily found Section 25656 invalid under Section 18 of
Article XX. Citing Justice Thornton in the 1881 case of Matter of
McGuire the court said, "there shall be no legislation either directly or
indirectly incapacitatingor disabling a woman from entering on or pursuing any business, vocation, or profession permitted by law to be entered in and pursued by those sometimes designated as the stronger
sex." (Emphasis added by the court).104
Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970) where the court was not certain as to the steadfastness of this criteria citing that Dame Judith Andersen once portrayed Hamlet.
100. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17 (1971).
101.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25656.

102. CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, §18.
103. CAL. CONST. art. I, §11, 21; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
104. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 8 (1971).
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Likewise the court found it elementary to void Section 25656 under Title VII. The court held that the state had failed to show that
women as a class were not physically strong enough to protect themselves and concluded that sex was not a BFOQ for a job as a bartender.
The court pointed out that the "saloon days of the Wild West" were
long gone. 10 5 There was no showing that "all or substantially all
to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
women would be1 0unable
6
the job involved.' 1
By far the most significant implications of Sail'er Inn lie in the
court's treatment of the equal protection arguments. California recognizes the two-level test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in reviewing legislative classifications. Where the classification deals with an
economic regulation the test is whether the challenged statute bears
"some reasonable relation to some conceivable legitimate state purpose.'1 0 7 On the other hand, strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show
a compelling interest is the standard applied when the classifications
involve "fundamental interests" or "suspect classifications."' 0 8 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not, as yet, treated sex as a
suspect classification, 0 9 the California supreme court, reasoning that
"sex like race is an immutable trait, a status to which class members
are locked into by the accident of birth", 1 0 concluded that sex based
classifications are properly treated as suspect."' While the future
implications of this holding appear far reaching, it is difficult to assess
these at the present time. This difficulty arises from the fact that the
court in Sail'er Inn, gave no indication as to what, if any, type of
state interest would be sufficiently compelling to justify a sex based
classification. 1 2 Furthermore, since the court apparently decided that
the bartender ordinance would be invalid under the less strict rational
basis test" 3 and that the ordinance was invalid on two other
grounds," 4 the creation of a "new" suspect classification would seem
unnecessary. Had the court desired merely to invalidate the ordinance, it could have relied solely on Title VII and thereby avoided the
equal protection issue. Hence the fact that the court felt compelled to
105. Id. at 9.
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id.
109. To date, the United States Supreme Court has reserved this label for race,
lineage, and poverty. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355
(1963).
110. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18 (1971).
111. Id. at 22.
112. 5 Cal. 3d 1 (1971).
113. Id. at 22.
114. Id. at 10, 15.
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extend a suspect status to sex raises serious questions as to the continued validity of any statute containing a sex based classification.
CONCLUSION
The Futureof State ProtectiveLegislation
As indicated above, Rosenfeld, and more particularly Sail'er Inn,
appear to cast serious doubt upon the continued validity of state protective legislation. If these cases can be taken to require that all differences in treatment between the sexes be eliminated in laws and regulations, there are several alternative, but equally disturbing, methods
of accomplishing this result.
The first alternative would be simply for the legislature to repeal all
labor legislation which refers to or classifies on the basis of sex. While
this approach may seem workable in dealing with prohibition ordinances such as the one involved in Sail'er Inn, it is not so easily applied to other existing labor laws and regulations. For example, repealing all sex based laws would mean that regulations such as the one
requiring employers to make certain that transportation is available
for women reporting to or leaving work between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.,
would be abolished. But do not laws such as the above serve much
need purposes?
Furthermore, Rosenfeld and Sail'er Inn could be extended, at least
arguably, to support the removal of the requirement that an employer
maintain separate toilet facilities for men and women. While this result may sound absurd, it illustrates the crux of the problem created
by these cases. Both courts have, in strongly worded language, put
forth reasons for the removal of sex based employment distinctions,
but neither has indicated a clear standard to determine when such a distinction will be valid.11
Presumably, the line will be drawn somewhere short of the above
bizzare example but neither case provides a rationale for developing
such a line.
A second alternative method of complying with Rosenfeld and Sail'er
Inn would be to extend all protective regulation equally to both sexes.
Yet, this method is hardly more workable than the first. Cost factors would not permit employers to furnish taxi rides to all employees
115. Rosenfeld would apparently leave only biological differences, when essential
to job performance, as a valid basis for a BFOQ, while Sail'er Inn requires that a
compelling interest be shown to justify sex based employment discrimination. Without
further classification, however, this language is not particularly helpful to an employer
in determining which employment practices or state labor laws comply with the mandate of these cases.

1972 / Sex Discrimination Provisions of Title VII
who start or leave work between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.1 16 Few, if any,
employers have the space or money to furnish a room for all employees with couches, or special ventilation, heating and lighting. 11 7 In
general the across the board extension of such laws would be both unnecessary and economically wasteful.
An apparent compromise to the above alternatives has been suggested.1 18 This approach would be to invalidate so called "restrictive" protective legislation and extend beneficial laws. "Restrictive"
laws are those which prohibit women from doing certain acts11 9 or enwhile the so called beneficial laws intering certain occupations,
clude minimum wage and overtime laws. 2 1 While this approach has
the advantage of saving some existing laws it is not without problems
of its own.
First, is there really a definable, significant difference between the
protective and beneficial laws? Of course, some laws can clearly be labeled as prohibitory-women may not tend bar-and some may be
clearly labeled as beneficial-there must be a couch in each rest
facility for women. But, is a law that mandates premium overtime
pay for women beneficial or prohibitory? On its face such a law appears to be beneficial. In reality, if the business is of the type that requires an extensive amount of overtime, women might not be hired because the cost would be greater than the cost to hire men. Therefore,
the operative effect of the law would be discriminatory, i.e. prohibitive towards women.
Further, if a law is beneficial towards women, it discriminates
against men in that they are not afforded the same benefit.
Aside from the conceptual difficulty in determining if a given law
is in effect beneficial or prohibitory, even the beneficial legislation
must contend with Sail'er Inn. As sex is now a suspect class, the state
must show compelling interest in order to justify a classification based
on sex. It is highly doubtful that the so-called beneficial laws such
as requiring couches for women, requiring a clean floor, requiring
hours, and the like, can be upheld
adequate transportation for unusual
1 22
theory.
interest
under a compelling
116. Title 8,CAL. ADM.CODE § 11180-3(e).
117. Id.at §11180-13, 11180-21, 11180-22, 11180-23.
118. Barnard, The Conflict Between State Protective Legislation and Federal
Laws Prohibiting Sex Discrimination: Is It Resolved? 17 WAYNE L. REv. 25 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Barnard]; See also, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1109
(1971).
119. Barnard at 42.
120. Barnard at 41.
121. Barnard at 43. See for example, Title 8, CAL. ADM. CODE §11180-4.
122. Apparently notions of chivalry as what conduct is "lady-like" will not be a
sufficiently compelling interest. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 20-21 (1971).
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In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the California Legislature was hesitant to act upon many of the statutes which have the
possible effect of discriminating between the sexes.'123 In one of the
few major bills in the 1971 Legislature designed to eliminate discrimination based upon sex, the provisions of the Labor Code pertaining to
minimum wages for women and minors were extended to men.124 How20
ever, those provisions dealing with weight-lifting 2 and overtime
that were specifically challenged in Rosenfeld were left untouched. 2 7
This action is particular noteworthy because Part 4 of Division 2 contains three chapters, one dealing with wages, hours and working conditions, another with weight-lifting and seating requirements, and the
third with maximum hours and overtime. In Assembly Bill 30 the
Legislature made Chapter 1, Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions
applicable to all employees, but declined to accept the opportunity to
do the same with Chapter 2, regulation of weight-lifting and seating
requirements, and Chapter 3, regulation of maximum hours and overtime.
It appears that as a result of the recent decisions in Rosenfeld and
Sail'er Inn, the Legislature may be forced to revamp all statutes that
treat sexes differently. Until such time, employers will be uncertain
as to the validity of their employment practices because of the uncertainty of Sail'er Inn and the incomplete interpretation of Title VII.

123. It is also possible that the legislature was waiting for the appellate decision of
Rosenfeld, the outcome of which was not decided until June 1, 1971, some two months
after the deadline to introduce new legislation for the 1971 session.
124. A.B. 30, 1971 Regular Session. This bill was vetoed on Dec. 22, 1971.
125. CAL. IAnOR CoDE §1252.
126. CAL. LABoR CODE §1350.
127. CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 457, p. -;

CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 901, p. -, and CAL.
STATs. 1971, c. 1066, p. -, all made amendments to or added new sections to the
Labor Code, but in no way did these chapters delete or change any discriminatory
provisions.

